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The second day of the symposium featured a
discussion of a scenario in which a medium-sized
American city is attacked with smallpox. Four
panels represented various time milestones after
the attack, from a few weeks to several months.
Panelists discussed what they and their
colleagues might be doing at each of these
milestones. The goal of the responses was to
communicate the complexity of the issues and to
explore the diverse problems that might arise
beyond the care and treatment of patients.
The scenario itself was a step-by-step
account of a smallpox epidemic in the fictional
city of Northeast. Tara OToole, the scenarios
lead author, read the narrative account before
each panel.
The panelists responded to the events as if
the epidemic were real and they were actually
trying to identify, contain, communicate, and
otherwise deal with it. Panel members included
experts on hospital, city, state, federal, and
media responses. Representing the hospitals
were John Bartlett and Trish Perl,  Johns
Hopkins Hospital; Julie Gerberding, Hospital
Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention; and Gregory Moran, Emergency
Medicine, University of California at Los
Angeles. Jerome Hauer represented New York
Citys response. Representing the state were
Michael Ascher, California Department of
Health Services Laboratory; Arne Carlson,
former governor of Minnesota; Terry OBrien, a
Minnesota State Assistant Attorney General;
and Michael Osterholm, Minnesota Department
of Public Health. The federal representatives on
the panels were Robert Blitzer, former
counterterrorism chief with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; Robert DeMartino, Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administra-
tion; Robert Knouss, Office of Emergency
Preparedness, Department of Health and
Human Services; and Scott Lillibridge, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. Joanne
Rodgers, Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions
Public Affairs, spoke to the response of the
media. George Strait, the medical news director
for ABC News, acted as moderator for each of the
panels scheduled on day two. D.A. Henderson
also helped to moderate.
Identifying the Agent
At the start of the epidemic, 2 weeks after the
bioterrorist attack, confusion reigns. There is
uncertainty as to what the infection is and
reluctance to diagnose smallpox even when it is
suspected. It is unclear who is in charge of
investigating and containing the epidemic.
Outside, reporters are knocking on the hospital
doors. The question of what took so long to
identify the agent opens the panel. Smallpox, a
nonspecific flulike illness, is hard to diagnose,
replies an emergency medicine physician. The
disease is not suspected because it was
eradicated in the late 1970s. Any laboratory
work on the first cases would initially be testing
for a battery of other causes, such as other viral
infections (e.g., monkeypox) or reactions to
recent vaccinations. A window of 2 weeks before
positive identification of smallpox may even be
optimistic. The diagnosis would probably take
much longer because of physicians lack of
familiarity with the disease.
When all the tests for other infections turn
up negative and smallpox is strongly suspected,
suggests a state laboratory chief, a conclusive
result from the laboratories at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or the
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) would still be
needed. These are the only two places in the
United States equipped to identify smallpox
virus in tissue samples. This part of the diagnosis
is fairly straightforward but it would take at
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least 1 day before the definitive results could be
obtained.
Responding at the Hospital Level
Hospitals would probably isolate the early
cases presumptively, even if smallpox was not
suspected, since the symptoms would appear
infectious. This is the opinion of a hospital
infections expert. In the city, argues a state
health department professional, several hospi-
tals would each see one or two of the first few
cases. The city health department would quickly
become aware of the similarity of the cases in the
various hospitals, recognize a potential outbreak
(probably measles) and mobilize early to contain it.
Once smallpox is identified, the following
organizations within city government would be
notified: the police department, the local
emergency management office, the city health
commissioners office, and, ultimately, the
mayors office. This process may be difficult since
it requires integrating the health department
into emergency management plans, an event with
little precedent, notes a city emergency official.
Coordinating Response Efforts
Who is in charge, agree panelists, is one of
the most important questions yearly in the
epidemic, because any large-scale relief effort
would require good management. Complicating
the answer, however, are various levels of
government, each with its own responsibilities
and perspective on response, as reflected in
panelists remarks.
Acts of domestic terrorism are under the
jurisdiction of the federal government, so several
federal agencies become involved, starting with
FBI. FBI is involved from the very beginning
since any cases of smallpox would indicate a
deliberate terrorist attack. A criminal investiga-
tion begins immediately. CDC is involved as soon
as samples are sent for laboratory diagnosis.
The state government becomes involved at
the outset, since major threats to public health
are dealt with on the state level. The state health
department starts its own investigation, and to
reassure the public, the governor may act as a
spokesperson for the management of the epidemic.
The city is involved from the outset, explains
the city emergency management official,
understanding that bioterrorism is a local
issue, which escalates very rapidly to state and
federal levels. The local police and emergency
management teams, as well as the city health
commissioner, the city health department, and
the mayor, are involved.
The problems of the city become state
problems immediately, counters the former
governor, because the news media treat any
potential infectious disease outbreak as a
regional problem. This forces the governors
hand. The governor has to move in because there
is a need for one person to be in charge.
The most difficult situation is how to deal with
the hospital patients. One danger in the early
days is losing control of the crisis through panic.
Once rumors about smallpox start to spread,
many workers within the hospital walk off the
job. Understaffing also leads to increased stress
and confusion for patients and providers alike.
Even before federal and state command
structures are in place, suggests a hospital
infections control expert, hospital epidemiolo-
gists would already be addressing infection
control issues. She notes that hospital infection
control specialists would be on the phone to
colleagues in other city hospitals alerting one
another. Hospital epidemiologists, adds a state
health official, would have a contact list of state,
local, and federal public-health authorities who
also would be notified.
Another problem in coordination becomes
clear to panelists: the difficulty in sharing
classified risk information among agencies and
various levels of government. Any early
warning, which could have contributed to a more
effective response, was missing in the scenario.
Even though the FBI had some early intelligence
of the attack, the alerting of health care workers
was nonexistent. The problem lies in the fact,
assesses a state health department official, that
health departments have never been seen as
intelligence communities, nor has there ever
been a precedent for passing such information to
them.
On the federal level, CDC addresses the
public health issues of the epidemic, and FBI
addresses the law enforcement issues. These
aims are not necessarily exclusive of one
another, and the possibility of linking efforts is
raised. Everyone interviewed as a part of the
epidemiologic investigation may have to be
interviewed as part of the criminal investigation
as well. Perhaps the most effective way to
accomplish this is to conduct both interviews
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Some aspects of the two federal agencies may
overlap, perhaps even conflict, in agendas.
Specimens that are sent to CDC for positive
identification of the smallpox virus may be
needed by FBI as evidence for any eventual
prosecution. In many ways, it may appear as if
FBI is running the investigation. However,
dealing with the sick, obtaining vaccine, and
mobilizing the epidemiologic investigation at the
local, state, and federal levels are outside the
scope of FBI. CDC takes the lead on these public
health issues, and together with FBI, coordi-
nates the management of federal resources.
However, who is coordinating activities at
the hospitals is still unclear, and the question of
authority on that level is unresolved. Can
outsiders come into a hospital and wield power,
and if so, who are they? Federal responders may
have ambiguous authority within a hospital and
may add to the chaos. An FBI offical notes that
his agencys role in the hospitals will simply be to
inform the doctors and administrators of what
the hospital needs to do to assist in the criminal
investigationkeeping evidence and coordinat-
ing interviews with patients. However, this may
still leave gaps of authority within the hospital.
In the scenario under consideration, the
state identifies one hospital as the smallpox
hospital, and this also presents a problem of
coordination. The hospital itself has to work out
the details of local quarantine and the distribution
of medicine to the patients, and there is a need to
protect the health-care workers and other
hospital staff. Vaccine should be immediately
available to these workers, and its distribution
will have to be coordinated with CDC.
Outside the hospitals, an epidemiologic
investigation will be taking place that will need
to be coordinated with CDC. A CDC official
points out the need for surveillance in the early
days of the epidemic. To assist in collecting data
necessary to identify the release source and
people at risk, he recommends that CDC provide
additional staff for much of the epidemiologic
work, including mid- and senior-level investiga-
tors. Bringing in these outside experts should
not represent a problem for local officials, he
suggests, since CDC already has strong ties with
state epidemiologists.
Informing the Public
How to control the message going to the
public weighs heavily upon the minds of all
panelists. Reporters on the hospital scene will
quickly become aware of any rumors and will
demand answers of any worker or official who is
handy. Official channels will not be the only
source of information during the epidemic,
argues the public affairs specialist.
First responders, such as the police or fire
officials, might show up with full biohazard
protection; such an image immediately raises
questions. The media will digest information
from day one, whether or not there is an official
statement from the city, state, or federal level.
Controlling the message that goes out over
the airwaves could be extremely difficult,
especially since there may not even be any
consensus on what the message should be in the
first place. Several panelists point out the need to
ensure that information presented to the media
is consistent and credible. The city emergency
manager suggests that the mayor will work with
federal and state officials to get consistent and
credible information out to the public. One viable
alternative to speculation and misinformation,
proposes an FBI official, is to have a centralized
joint information center, such as the one his
agency set up in Oklahoma City after the
bombing, with several experts answering all the
questions that arise.
Regardless of how information is dissemi-
nated, the message must be carefully considered.
If the flulike symptoms of smallpox are identified
on the evening news, a flood of noninfected
persons with stuffy noses or headaches could
swell emergency rooms across the state. Other
reports, such as upcoming quarantine efforts,
may also spread panic and should be handled
carefully. The types of stories the media choose to
write present a challenge. The press will not only
cover the crisis but the managers of the crisis.
Plans for responding to questions about crisis
management must be in place. Whether or not
the message that goes out to the public includes
mention of terrorism should be weighed.
The hospital infections expert pursues a
different angle to the issue of information
exchange. The difficulties in interviewing the
public have not been solved, she points out. Who
will do the interviews? How they will be
coordinated with criminal investigations? Who
will receive vaccine? And how will health-care
workers be protected? Will the system be
overwhelmed by false casespeople who think
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in the early days of the epidemic is the need for
an infrastructure to handle the large volume of
calls flooding the hospitals.
Handling Logistics
What will be the plan of action? Hundreds of
people will have to be mobilized to interview the
public, and hundreds more will be needed to
administer vaccine. The distribution of antibiot-
ics and vaccines represents a logistical problem
that must be overcome.
As the epidemic grows and spreads to several
states, friction between the levels of government
grows. Governors are demanding vaccine
supplies, fueling a larger debate of how
vaccination should be handled. Tens of
thousands of people are vaccinated, but many
more still need vaccine. Media reports begin to be
critical of the governments handling of the
crisis.
What still needs to be done? With a growing
number of deaths, the rise in the number of
patients in quarantine, the loss of critical health-
care workers and city emergency workers,
within the city things are beginning to get out of
focus, notes a city official. Asking how leadership
will function inside the hospital, the hospital
epidemiologist identifies a need for official
responses that are well thought out, strong, and
based on hard science.
The vaccine campaign poses significant
issues. The limited supply of vaccine must be
divided up and distributed according to greatest
riskpersons who may have been infected or
who care for those infected, argues an official in
federal emergency management. Political lead-
ers and essential city workers are other priority
groups. A consensus must be reached as to how to
proceed with the vaccinations. CDC is best suited
to coordinate vaccine efforts, but the public
health community must work towards an
emergency. The governor, warns the city
emergency manager, may step in and call the
shots. There is a need for a public health
emergency plan. Did the outbreak start from a
single source or from multiple sources? This
determination would help with vaccine manage-
ment and allocation, but there is no answer.
Moreover, testing facilities at CDC and USAMRIID
are overwhelmed at this point in the epidemic.
Hospitals must deal with quarantine.
Restrictions are imposed in the first days or
weeks of an epidemic. Workers fear of being
sequestered causes them to leave hospitals
understaffed. Many people are likely to stay at
their posts if they feel they have reliable
information and support, argues a mental health
provider. Some, however, may leave the front
lines to go home to their own families.
Legal Ramifications
According to a 1905 Massachusetts case,
cites a states assistant attorney general,
compulsory vaccinations are not a violation of
due process and are therefore legal. So the local,
state, and federal levels of government have no
obstacle to vaccinating those designated at risk.
A more difficult legal question is that of
quarantining smallpox patients. Many of the
public health codes used to allocate powers to
government officials are old and may not be valid
or useful. Also, court precedents from HIV cases
may have heavily weighted matters in favor of
due process. Minnesota, for example, requires a
separate court hearing for each case of
quarantine. Thus, quarantine may be possible in
a hospital but not in the community.
Another basic legal question is whether the
lines of legal support are clear to all officials,
such as hospital guards and police officers. How
far can police go to detain quarantined patients?
The limits of emergency powers should be clearly
delineated in any predisaster planning.
The epidemic is threatening to expand
beyond the city into the rest of the country and
even beyond. The World Health Organization
(WHO) will probably become involved, and travel
notifications have to be introduced.
Vaccine Supply
Even without adequate supplies of vaccine,
much can be done with the existing stocks.
Prevaccinating some health-care workers is a
proactive approach. Having a sizable pool of
prevaccinated professionals who can mobilize
and act as emergency responders takes much of
the pressure off local hospitals. One way to
reduce secondary transmission (outside of
vaccinating the contacts of the infected person),
instructs the hospital epidemiologist, is good
infection controlwearing filter masks and
washing hands well. Another way of controlling
the epidemic is through quarantine. While these
measures are not a substitute for adequate
vaccine supply, they can slow the epidemic.551 Vol. 5, No. 4, JulyAugust 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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One problem with the vaccine supply is that
many more people want to be vaccinated than
limited stores permit. There are not even enough
stores of vaccine to prevent the spread of the
epidemic. The existing 6 to 7 million doses of
smallpox vaccine will not last forever, and the 36
months it takes for additional large-scale
preparations is prohibitive, argues a vaccine
campaign expert. Health officials will likely not
have the time or resources to target precisely
those people who have an actual need for vaccine.
The need for vaccine will overwhelm the supply.
The cost of vaccine development may inhibit
stockpiling, proposes a CDC official. Since an
attack with smallpox is of low probability, large-
scale production may be difficult to justify. A
partnership between private industry and the
government would help, however. Also, the cost
of getting caught without an adequate supply
could be disastrous.
Possible emergency measures to stretch the
vaccine supply, proposes a smallpox expert,
include arm-to-arm vaccination as pustules form
on the arms of vaccinated people; vaccinia could
be grown in massive amounts in tissue culture;
and 30 million doses of vaccine could be
contracted from South Africa.
The Final Stage
The smallpox epidemic has become a major
public health emergency affecting several cities
in many states and at least four other countries.
The event is identified as a terrorist attack,
because no other source of smallpox outside a
deliberate release exists. For those who have
already contracted smallpox, antiviral drugs,
such as cydolfivir, may be useful but these
medicines may be just as scarce as the vaccines.
Secondary transmission got out of hand,
vaccine use did not contain the epidemic, and
standard planning did not work. Thus a state
health official sums up the deficiencies of
response. Hospital resources have been over-
whelmed, with people flooding emergency rooms
in the belief they have smallpox. These cases are
added to hospitalized cases before and during the
epidemic; yet there are not even enough beds for
all the sick. The hospital staff have become
physically and emotionally exhausted from the
long hours and from seeing about a third of
infected patients die.
Failure of containment has turned the
outbreak from local to national and interna-
tional. However, the epidemic would have been
much worse, had it gone unchecked, notes a state
health official. Containment was significant. The
15,000 smallpox cases could have easily been
more than 100,000.
No perpetrators have yet been identified,
despite combining the criminal and the
epidemiologic investigations. Such methodical
work, however, is important because, unless the
intelligence community comes up with informa-
tion or a tip, there is no other way to identify the
source of the epidemic, explains an FBI offical.
Many of the problems in the epidemic could
have been avoided or controlled if extensive
plans had existed, panelists agree. The panelist
speaking from a governors perspective identifies
leadership as the most pressing void. Should the
city have been placed under immediate
quarantine? Should martial law have been
implemented? Is the designation of a single
smallpox hospital a reasonable thing for any city
to do? These are difficult questions to face in the
wake of a disaster. Such issues must be
addressed long before trouble strikes.
Who Will Pay for the Smallpox Epidemic?
The significant cost of curtailing the
epidemic is debated. How will a smallpox
hospital be financed, inquires a physician. The
money might come from the federal government
as emergency management funding, suggests a
city emergency manager. The infrastructure and
linkages within the public health community
could be improved, the capacity for laboratory
testing of samples could be increased, surveil-
lance methods could be enhanced, and a health
information strategy could be developed.
While the smallpox scenario is certainly
frightening, experience with earlier epidemics
(smallpox among them), knowledge of the issues,
and expertise to deal with them show that in a
crisis people from all disciplines pull together.
Mr. Bardi is a freelance writer in Baltimore who
holds degrees in biophysics and science writing from
Johns Hopkins University.